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lNsURANCB-The City of Knoxville owned and operated a m~nicipal airport under authority of a state statute which permitted a municipality
to acquire, maintain, and operate a municipal airport in its governmental
capacity, and which barred suits against the municipality with respect to its
operation of the airport.1 The city carried a policy of liability insurance covering
it in the ownership and operation of the airport. Plaintiff was injured by a fall
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3 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1942 Replacement) §§2726.13, 2726.22.
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at the airport terminal building, and instituted a negligence action against the
city. The city moved for dismissal, relying upon the immunity given it by
the statute. Held, motion to dismiss overruled. The city waived its immunity
to suit to the extent of the insurance carried by it at the time of the accident.
Bailey v. City of Knoxville, (D.C. Tenn. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 3.
According to a well-established though often condemned2 common law
doctrine, a municipal corporation is liable only for torts committed by its agents
in the performance of proprietary, corporate, ministerial, or private functions,
and is immune to tort liability for wrongs committed in the performance of
governmental or public functions. 3 This immunity generally cannot be waived
without the authorization of the state legislature.4 In many states the legislature
has restricted the area of immunity,5 but such legislative modifications have
affected only a relatively few of the immune functions of municipal corporations
in the United States. Interesting questions are posed, therefore, when a
municipality, with or without statutory authorization, has taken out a liability
insurance policy covering it and its agents. The few jurisdictions which have
faced this problem have held almost unanimously that such protection does not
operate to waive the common law immunity, even pro tanto. 6 The usual theory
behind sui:;h decisions is that a municipal corporation has no power to waive
its immunity by its own act, 7 or, if the insurance policy has been purchased
under statutory authorization, that no waiver of immunity will be implied from
such authorization.8 However, Tennessee, 9 and possibly Kentucky,10 have
2 The best known criticism is that found in Borchard, "Government Liability in
Tort," 34 YALE L.J. 129, 229 (1924, 1925). See also HARPER, TORTS §295 (1933), and
the many articles cited in Repko, "American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal Tort Liability," 9 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 214 (1942).
a See 18 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., c. 53 (1950). In South
Carolina, however, immunity is granted without regard to the distinction between corporate and government functions. Looper v. City of Easley, 172 S.C. 11, 172 S.E. 705 (1934).
4Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 41 A. (2d) 111 (1945); Stephenson v.
Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E. (2d) 195 (1950); Boice v. Bd. of Education of Rock
District, lll W.Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931). But see Matter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y.
61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933) (city permitted to waive its immunity and accept a liability
based upon a moral obligation).
5 E.g., 23 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1942) §§50-a to 50-c; Cal. Gen. Laws
(Deering, 1944) No. 5619; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §701.02. See the proposed
statutes in Borchard, ''Report of the Committee on Municipal Tort Liability," 7 AM.
Mumc. L. REv. 250 (1942).
·
6 Kesman v. School District of Fallowfield Twp., 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. (2d) 17 (1942);
Rittmiller v. School District No. 84, (D.C. Minn. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 187; Hummer v.
School City of Hartford City, (Ind. 1953) 112 N.E. (2d) 891; Stephenson v. Raleigh,
note 4 supra; Utz v. Bd. of Education of Brooks County, 126 W.Va. 823, 30 S.E. (2d)
342 (1944); Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. (2d) 736 (1947).
7 Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, note 4 supra; Boice v. Bd. of Education of Rock
District, note 4 supra; Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, note 6 supra.
s Rittmiller v. School District No. 84, note 6 supra; Utz v. Bd. of Education of Brooks
County, note 6 supra; Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, note 6 supra.
9Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. (2d) 414 (1936); Taylor v. Cobble, 28
Tenn. App. 167, 187 S.W. (2d) 648 (1945); City of Kingsport v. Lane, 35 Tenn. App.
183, 243 s.w. (2d) 289 (1951). ·
10 Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W. (2d) 700 (1942).
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held that the purchase of liability insurance by a municipal corporation waives
its immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage, and it is this line of
authority in Tennessee that the principal case follows. 11 The Tennessee theory
is that immunity rests upon a trust fund concept, and that so far as judgments
may be satisfied out of an insurance fund there is no reason for the immunity.12
A second problem that arises when a municipal corporation purchases liability
insurance to cover a function within the immunity sphere is whether the
municipality has the power to make such a contract: is the municipality spending
public funds for a private rather than a public purpose?13 What little direct
authority there is on this subject suggests that a municipal corporation may not
have the power to purchase liability insurance where no obligation exists to
pay a possible claim.14 Regardless of any theoretical objections to the result
reached in the principal case, however, it would seem that it offers, in lieu of
legislation, an excellent means of relief from the immunity doctrine.
Chester F. Relyea, S.Ed.

11 In the principal case the legislature had not authorized the purchase of the insurance, the situation to this extent being like that in City of Kingsport v. Lane, note 9 supra,
and unlike that in Rogers v. Butler, note 9 supra, the only other case in accord with the
principal case decided by the Tennesse Supreme Court.
12 Rogers v. Butler, note 9 supra.
1s 15 McQOILLIN MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., §§39.19 to 39.31 (1950).
14 Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, note 6 supra; Bd. of Education v. Co=ercial
Casualty Ins. Co., ll6 W.Va. 503, 182 S.E. 87 (1935) (board of education permitted
to recover premiums paid for liability insurance since acquisition of insurance did not remove
its immunity to suit). See also Am. GEN. OF MrNN. REP., Op. No. 60 (1940). OP.
Am. GEN. OF PA. No. 324 (1940); Rosenfield, "Governmental Immunity from Liability for
Torts in School Accidents," 5 LEcAL NOTES ON LocAL Gov. 358 at 369 (1940). A contrary
conclusion is implied, of course, where the taking out of a liability insurance policy by a
municipal corporation is held to waive its immunity pro tanto. See City of Kingsport v.
Lane, note 9 supra, and the principal case.

